Why Putin Will Not Stop at Donbas: Peace in Ukraine and Russia’s Ambitions

Would surrendering Donbas to Russia really bring peace to Ukraine? Vladimir Putin's territorial demands extend beyond Donetsk and Luhansk, raising fundamental questions about Ukrainian sovereignty, NATO, and European security. This in-depth legal and geopolitical analysis examines why territorial concessions alone may not guarantee a lasting peace and explores the role of international law in preventing future aggression.
Could ceding Donbas really bring the war in Ukraine to an end? Russia's territorial claims, the conditions imposed by Moscow, and Vladimir Putin's strategic objectives raise questions that extend far beyond control over Donetsk and Luhansk. This legal and geopolitical analysis examines why a territorial compromise, without robust security guarantees, might prove insufficient to establish a lasting peace.
For more than four years, Europe has witnessed a war that has progressively transformed not only the continent's geopolitical balance but also the very meaning of the words peace, security, and sovereignty. Every new diplomatic initiative brings an apparently straightforward question back to the centre of international debate: would granting the Russian Federation control over the entire Donbas be sufficient to secure a definitive end to hostilities? Personally, I have profound doubts. Not because I believe that a negotiated agreement with Vladimir Putin is impossible, nor because I consider the continuation of the war desirable, but because an examination of Russia's demands, their historical evolution, and the Kremlin's most recent positions suggests that Donbas represents only one component of a much broader political and strategic project.
An essential methodological distinction must, however, be established. Arguing that Putin will not necessarily stop at Donbas is a geopolitical assessment grounded in verifiable evidence; asserting that he will never accept any form of peace would instead mean attributing future intentions to him that no observer can know with certainty. A legally rigorous analysis must distinguish between the objectives formally declared by the Russian Federation, the conditions actually advanced during negotiations, and the potential strategic consequences of an agreement. It is precisely this distinction that makes the prospect of a peace settlement based solely on Ukrainian territorial concessions particularly troubling.
To understand the nature of the conflict, we must first clarify that Donbas, consisting primarily of the administrative regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, does not encompass all the territories claimed by Russia. In 2014, Moscow occupied and subsequently unilaterally annexed Crimea, while an armed conflict began in eastern Ukraine that same year, involving separatist formations supported by the Russian Federation. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion, conducting military operations along northern approaches towards Kyiv and across southern Ukraine. In September of that year, Russia proclaimed the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, including portions of territory that its armed forces did not control and that, even today, remain outside its complete occupation.
This circumstance carries decisive political and legal significance. If the military operation had been intended exclusively to secure control of Donbas, it would be difficult to explain why the Kremlin also claimed two additional southern regions. The proclaimed annexation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia is not a marginal detail but the formal expression of territorial ambitions extending beyond the geographical boundaries of Donbas. It is therefore necessary to question what a concession limited to Donetsk and Luhansk would actually achieve if Moscow continued to regard other parts of Ukrainian territory as legitimately belonging to Russia.
On June 14, 2024, Putin had already outlined a proposal making the cessation of military operations conditional upon the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the entire administrative territories of the four regions claimed by Russia, together with Kyiv's renunciation of NATO membership. These conditions were accompanied by demands concerning Ukrainian neutrality, recognition of Russia's territorial acquisitions, and a revision of the Western sanctions regime. This was therefore not a proposal confined to resolving a border dispute, but a comprehensive set of conditions intended to reshape Ukraine's territorial configuration, military capabilities, and international position.
The subsequent memorandum presented by the Russian delegation during the Istanbul talks on June 2, 2025, confirmed the breadth of these demands. According to Reuters, Moscow sought recognition of its claims over Crimea and four Ukrainian regions, Ukrainian neutrality, restrictions on Ukraine's military capabilities, and additional political conditions. The Ukrainian delegation rejected this framework, considering it incompatible with the country's independence and its ability to defend itself against future aggression. The disagreement between the parties therefore concerned not merely where a new military dividing line should be drawn, but how much sovereignty Ukraine would retain after the conflict ended.
The diplomatic developments of November 2026 make this issue even clearer. During the trilateral talks held in Abu Dhabi on November 10 and 11, with United States mediation, the delegations made some progress on humanitarian matters, particularly regarding the exchange of prisoners of war. No agreement was reached, however, on the principal political and territorial issues. The subsequent meeting on November 12 between Putin and US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner revealed no abandonment of the Kremlin's main demands.
During that meeting, Putin reiterated that, from Moscow's perspective, the territorial reference point should be Russia's state border rather than disputed grey zones or demilitarised areas potentially subject to future disagreements. The significance of this statement is considerable: under Russian domestic law, the four regions whose annexation was proclaimed in 2022 are considered part of the Federation, although their incorporation has no legal validity under international law. Consequently, the reference to the state border, interpreted in light of Russian domestic legislation and previous presidential declarations, appears consistent with an intention to secure control over territories considerably more extensive than Donbas alone. This issue was also highlighted in the November 12 analysis by the Institute for the Study of War and in corresponding international media reports.
Even more significant is the information that emerged on November 14, 2026. According to The Washington Post, a document setting out Russia's negotiating positions reportedly renewed the demand to return NATO military deployments in Eastern Europe to their 1997 configuration, while also imposing restrictions on Ukraine's armed forces, Western military supplies, and Kyiv's participation in certain European security arrangements. It is essential to clarify that the document described by the press does not constitute a signed agreement and cannot, from an evidentiary standpoint, be equated with an official treaty. Nevertheless, it represents a significant indication, since the reported conditions are consistent with demands Russia had publicly advanced before the 2022 invasion.
This brings us to the central argument of my analysis: Putin does not appear to be pursuing territorial expansion alone, but also a redefinition of the balance of power between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the West. Donbas represents a strategically important territorial objective, but the demands concerning NATO, Ukrainian neutrality, and restrictions on Western military assistance belong to an entirely different dimension. They affect the right of a sovereign state to determine its own foreign and defence policies, as well as the freedom of other European states to establish their own security arrangements.
To understand how far these ambitions predate the full-scale war, it is useful to return to July 12, 2021, when Putin published his essay On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. In that text, the Russian president advanced a particular interpretation of the shared history of the two peoples, portraying their political and cultural separation as deeply problematic. Naturally, common historical, linguistic, or religious origins do not, in themselves, constitute a project of territorial annexation. However, when such arguments are employed to challenge the autonomy of an independent state's political choices, they acquire a revisionist dimension. The analysis conducted by the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies, known as OSW, highlighted precisely this issue: the difficulty within Putin's political worldview of fully accepting the existence of a Ukraine independent of Russia's sphere of influence.
In December of the same year, Moscow presented the United States and NATO with two draft agreements concerning European security. Among the demands were restrictions on further enlargement of the Alliance and limitations on military deployments in the territories of states that had joined NATO after 1997. These were demands concerning the entire European strategic order, advanced before the invasion of February 2022. In light of the developments reported in November 2026, the continuity between those earlier positions and the Kremlin's current demands is difficult to overlook.
This does not mean that Russian security concerns should automatically be disregarded. International law does not prevent states from discussing reciprocal arms-control measures, mutually agreed restrictions on military deployments, or diplomatic instruments designed to reduce the risk of escalation. The issue lies elsewhere: the principle of mutual security does not entitle a state to unilaterally impose the surrender of sovereignty upon its neighbours, nor does it justify the use of force to achieve territorial changes. Negotiating a sustainable security balance for all parties is one thing; demanding that a country's political independence be subordinated to the consent of a neighbouring power is quite another.
On this point, the international legal framework is particularly clear. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Article 2(3) requires international disputes to be settled by peaceful means. Article 51, meanwhile, recognises the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack, within the limits established by the Charter. It follows that the existence of a territorial dispute, even one accompanied by historical claims or ethnic tensions, does not constitute an independent legal justification for the military invasion of a sovereign state.
It was precisely in light of these principles that the United Nations General Assembly, through Resolution ES-11/1 of March 2, 2022, deplored the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine, demanding an end to the use of force and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine's internationally recognised territory. Subsequently, through Resolution ES-11/4 of October 12, 2022, the General Assembly condemned the so-called referendums organised in occupied regions and declared that Russia's attempted annexations could not produce legal effects capable of altering the status of the territories concerned. General Assembly resolutions do not have the same binding force as decisions adopted by the Security Council in the exercise of its powers. Nevertheless, they express an international position of considerable significance, grounded in the principles of the Charter.
The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 must also be considered, as it enshrines fundamental principles of European security, including the inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity of states, and the prohibition of the use of force. The Budapest Memorandum of December 5, 1994, also deserves particular attention. Through this instrument, connected with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state, Russia, together with the United States and the United Kingdom, reaffirmed its commitment to respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and existing borders, as well as its obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the country. This was not an automatic military intervention guarantee comparable to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, a legal distinction frequently overlooked in public debate. Nevertheless, that distinction does not diminish the significance of the commitments undertaken or their subsequent violation.
The issue also involves the principle of the self-determination of peoples, sometimes invoked in support of Russian claims over Donbas. Self-determination is unquestionably a fundamental principle of international law, recognised in Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter and in the common Article 1 of the two International Covenants on Human Rights of 1966. However, it cannot automatically be equated with a general right to unilateral secession, nor can it be invoked to legitimise annexation carried out through military occupation by a foreign power. Conditions of freedom, authenticity, and the absence of coercion are decisive in any assessment of the expression of a population's will. A referendum organised under military occupation cannot, merely by virtue of a vote taking place, be considered sufficient to transfer territorial sovereignty lawfully.
There is also a domestic constitutional issue in Ukraine, too often overlooked when discussing the possibility of ceding Donbas in exchange for peace. Article 2 of the Ukrainian Constitution recognises the unity and inviolability of the national territory, while Article 73 establishes that questions concerning alterations to the territory of the state must be resolved exclusively through a nationwide referendum. An individual decision by President Volodymyr Zelensky, or a simple political agreement reached with a foreign power, would therefore not be sufficient. Article 157 also prohibits constitutional amendments aimed at undermining independence or territorial integrity and prevents constitutional revision during martial law or a state of emergency. Any potential referendum must consequently be assessed in light of the entire constitutional framework and the actual circumstances under which it could take place.
This legal framework requires a distinction between three profoundly different situations: the legal recognition of Russian sovereignty over certain territories, the temporary acceptance of a ceasefire line corresponding to existing military positions, and the postponement of the territorial dispute's resolution to future negotiations. The first would entail relinquishing territorial sovereignty; the second could simply regulate the suspension of hostilities without changing the legal title to sovereignty; the third would expressly leave the dispute unresolved. Confusing these scenarios risks transforming a possible de-escalation measure into a legal concession with potentially permanent consequences.
I consider particularly dangerous the prospect of an agreement requiring Ukraine to withdraw from areas of Donbas still under its control without simultaneously providing credible mechanisms of protection against renewed aggression. The part of Donetsk region that remains under Ukrainian administration includes a network of urban centres, infrastructure, and defensive positions of considerable strategic importance, including the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk area. Relinquishing these positions could alter future military balances, depriving Kyiv of essential elements of its territorial defence. This would therefore involve not merely the loss of geographical territory, but potentially the weakening of Ukraine's ability to prevent further advances.
A previous negotiating development must nevertheless be considered to avoid overly categorical conclusions. In August 2025, during diplomatic contacts with US President Donald Trump in Alaska, Putin reportedly suggested, according to subsequent media accounts also referenced by the US Congressional Research Service, the possibility of freezing front lines in the southern regions in exchange for a Ukrainian withdrawal from areas of Donetsk still controlled by Kyiv. This indicates that the Kremlin might, under certain circumstances, consider territorial compromises or a suspension of military operations that differ from its maximalist demands. It does not, however, establish that Russia would be prepared to permanently abandon its other territorial claims or, more importantly, its political and strategic conditions concerning Ukraine's future.
This is precisely where the distinction between securing a truce and building a lasting peace becomes essential. A truce may result from a temporary compromise, supported by the military advantage of suspending combat operations. A stable peace, by contrast, requires the parties to have genuine incentives to respect the agreement, sufficiently precise obligations, and mechanisms capable of deterring future violations. Without these elements, the cessation of hostilities could become a period of military reorganisation rather than the definitive end of the conflict.
The history of the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 offers an important lesson, although it does not justify simplistic comparisons with the present situation. Those agreements provided for ceasefire measures, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, forms of international monitoring, and a complex political process concerning the disputed areas. Their implementation remained incomplete amid violations, divergent interpretations, and profound disagreements over the sequencing of security measures and political reforms. The failure of the process does not demonstrate that every negotiation is destined to fail. It does, however, illustrate how an agreement lacking effective implementation mechanisms and mutual trust may prove insufficient to prevent subsequent escalation.
Another relevant factor concerns the language used by the Kremlin to describe the objectives of the war. Expressions such as "demilitarisation", "denazification", and the removal of the alleged root causes of the conflict have frequently appeared in Russian political communications. These are political and propagandistic categories, not independent legal grounds capable of legitimising an invasion. In particular, the demand to drastically reduce Ukraine's military capabilities must also be examined in light of a state's right to organise its own defence. A territorially diminished and militarily weakened Ukraine, simultaneously deprived of external guarantees, would find itself in a condition of structural vulnerability.
It might be argued that territorial concessions and neutrality would satisfy Russia's security requirements, thereby removing the reasons Moscow claims to have for its military intervention. This argument deserves examination rather than summary dismissal. International neutrality arrangements are not inherently incompatible with full state sovereignty, provided they result from a free choice and are accompanied by credible security conditions. The problem arises when neutrality, military restrictions, and territorial concessions are imposed through force or under the threat of its continued use. In such circumstances, one must ask whether the outcome would strengthen stability or create a state effectively subordinated to another country's will.
For this reason, I do not find convincing the argument that accepting Russian demands would automatically represent the quickest route to a definitive peace. It might lead to a suspension of fighting, but it would not necessarily eliminate the factors that produced the conflict. On the contrary, if an eventual agreement left unresolved the questions of Ukraine's political autonomy, its defensive capabilities, and the recognition of its borders, the conditions of instability could persist even after military operations had ceased.
There is, of course, an opposing consideration that must be addressed with equal seriousness. The continuation of the war entails enormous human, social, and economic costs and cannot be regarded as an end in itself. According to the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, at least 2,570 civilians were verified as killed and 15,211 as injured during the first nine months of 2026. In September 2026 alone, 328 civilian deaths and 2,105 injuries were verified. These figures represent documented casualties and do not necessarily include everyone actually affected. Behind every statistic are shattered lives, separated families, people forced to abandon their homes, and communities deprived of the essential conditions for living in safety.
Those who advocate urgent negotiations cannot automatically be accused of supporting Putin, just as those who insist on the importance of Ukrainian security guarantees cannot, for that reason alone, be characterised as supporters of an indefinite continuation of the war. Democratic debate requires acknowledging that both concerns arise from genuine issues: on the one hand, the urgency of stopping further deaths; on the other, the risk that a poorly constructed peace could make renewed aggression possible. The responsibility of international politics is to pursue a solution capable of addressing both problems without reducing the lives of affected populations to a mere bargaining variable.
In my view, a credible diplomatic process should begin by distinguishing immediate humanitarian protection measures from the definitive settlement of the conflict. A verifiable cessation of attacks, the protection of essential civilian infrastructure, prisoner exchanges, the search for missing persons, the protection of children, and the establishment of humanitarian corridors are objectives that can and must be pursued even in the absence of a comprehensive agreement on territorial sovereignty. International humanitarian law continues to apply throughout the conflict and does not make civilian protection conditional upon the conclusion of a peace treaty.
The relevant legal instruments include the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the protection of civilians in time of war, together with the applicable rules of customary international humanitarian law. The protection of civilian populations, the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, the principle of proportionality, and the obligation to take precautions during military operations are legal constraints that cannot be suspended on the basis of political or negotiating considerations. Obligations concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, regulated by the Third Geneva Convention, must likewise be respected regardless of the prospects for a diplomatic settlement.
A comprehensive agreement should also establish independent verification mechanisms, procedures for determining violations, sufficiently precise guarantees against the resumption of hostilities, and a framework linking any restrictive measures to the effective implementation of agreed commitments. The possible establishment of demilitarised zones would require detailed provisions concerning their geographical extent, supervision, and the conduct of the forces involved. The deployment of international observers or contingents would similarly need to be assessed in light of the legal and political conditions of their mandate and their practical ability to perform their assigned functions effectively.
Security guarantees probably represent one of the most difficult issues. Ukraine seeks mechanisms that would reduce the likelihood of another invasion, while Moscow rejects the prospect of a Western military presence on Ukrainian territory and continues to oppose Kyiv's closer relationship with NATO. A negotiated settlement cannot simply proclaim a general commitment to mutual security. It must clarify which conduct would be prohibited, which monitoring instruments would be available, and what concrete consequences would follow from non-compliance. A purely political guarantee, lacking implementation procedures and credible deterrent capacity, would risk reproducing weaknesses already exposed in previous agreements.
The security dimension must also be accompanied by justice. Contemporary international law does not regard the conclusion of a conflict as automatically incompatible with accountability for international crimes. Through its order on provisional measures of March 16, 2022, in the proceedings concerning allegations of genocide, the International Court of Justice ordered the Russian Federation to immediately suspend the military operations commenced on February 24, 2022. It is important to clarify that this was a provisional judicial measure and did not constitute a final judgment on the broader question of international responsibility arising from the war.
International criminal justice, meanwhile, follows separate legal processes. The International Criminal Court exercises the jurisdiction established by the Rome Statute over crimes falling within its competence, while specific jurisdictional limitations apply to the crime of aggression. To address this gap, Ukraine and the Council of Europe signed an agreement on June 25, 2025, establishing a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, whose organisational and operational development continued in 2026. Criminal justice cannot be reduced to an instrument of diplomatic pressure, but neither should it automatically be sacrificed for the sake of political compromise. Any individual criminal responsibility must be established through independent proceedings, respecting the presumption of innocence and the guarantees of a fair trial.
The European Union, for its part, cannot be regarded as an external observer in this debate. The war directly concerns the continent's security, the stability of its eastern borders, the protection of civilian populations, and the credibility of the principles upon which European integration rests. Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union directs the Union's external action towards respect for democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights, the principles of the United Nations Charter, and international law. A diplomatic settlement affecting European security without adequate involvement of the institutions and states concerned would risk creating imbalances capable of surviving long after the end of hostilities.
The Italian Constitution also provides a fundamental point of reference. Article 11 repudiates war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means of settling international disputes, while permitting, on conditions of equality with other states, such limitations of sovereignty as may be necessary for an international order that ensures peace and justice among nations. This provision does not impose absolute neutrality in the face of every aggression, nor does it prescribe a particular diplomatic or military strategy. Rather, it requires Italian international policy to remain consistent with the rejection of wars of aggression, the pursuit of peaceful solutions, and respect for international obligations.
We must not, however, overlook a fundamental political consideration: the possibility that the Russian leadership seeks to maintain a permanent capacity to influence and constrain Ukraine. A country that remains formally independent but lacks adequate defensive capabilities, faces constant military threats, and is unable to determine its international relations freely could preserve its legal personality as a state while suffering a substantial reduction in its effective autonomy. From this perspective, control over Donbas would represent only one of the instruments through which influence could be exercised over Ukraine's future political and strategic orientation.
This does not imply that the Kremlin possesses unlimited resources or that further military expansion is inevitable. The economic and human costs of the war, Ukrainian resistance, the industrial and military capabilities of the parties, international sanctions, and the decisions of other powers all constitute factors capable of altering Russia's strategic calculations. An agreement might become advantageous to Moscow even without the full achievement of its originally proclaimed objectives. However, a negotiating possibility is not equivalent to a guarantee, and the task of rigorous analysis is precisely to identify the conditions that would make a compromise sufficiently credible.
For this reason, I believe it is necessary to avoid two extremes: the view that every concession necessarily constitutes surrender, and the opposite assumption that any territorial concession automatically produces peace. Diplomacy involves the pursuit of compromises, but not all compromises carry the same legal and strategic consequences. A temporary agreement suspending hostilities, accompanied by non-recognition of annexations, independent verification, and robust security guarantees, is not legally equivalent to a definitive transfer of sovereignty obtained under military pressure.
I also believe that it must be primarily for the Ukrainian people, acting through their legitimate institutions and in accordance with their Constitution and international law, to determine their country's future. States providing diplomatic or military support to Kyiv may formulate proposals, offer guarantees, and encourage compromises, but they should not replace the state that holds territorial sovereignty. Peace cannot be built by disregarding the political will and constitutional safeguards of the country directly concerned.
The issue of Donbas must therefore be placed within its proper context. Russia's demands extend to additional territories, conditions governing the structure of Ukraine's armed forces, restrictions on its foreign policy, and a revision of fundamental elements of the European security architecture. The positions emerging in November 2026 do not allow us to assert that Putin has definitively ruled out every compromise. They do, however, demonstrate that the Kremlin continues to regard matters far broader than the mere control of Donetsk and Luhansk as subjects for negotiation.
My conviction, therefore, is that ceding Donbas, considered in isolation, would provide no certainty that the war would definitively end. Such a concession could form part of a broader agreement, provided that it were freely accepted by the parties concerned and accompanied by genuinely effective security arrangements. Equally, however, it could leave the principal causes of the geopolitical confrontation intact. Without credible guarantees, the risk would be to secure a suspension of the conflict while failing to remove the conditions that could allow it to resume.
Peace does not necessarily coincide with the temporary absence of fighting. A just and sustainable peace requires institutions capable of enforcing agreements, effective protection of individuals, stability in international relations, and safeguards against renewed aggression. This does not mean demanding a perfect outcome before hostilities can stop: a humanitarian truce can save lives even while political disputes remain unresolved. Rather, it means refusing to confuse the urgency of ending violence with the assumption that any diplomatic solution will necessarily endure.
This is why I remain deeply sceptical of the idea that simply handing Donbas over to Russia would be enough to end the war. The Kremlin's demands, the history of the conflict, and its most recent negotiating positions suggest that the stakes are considerably higher: not merely control over one region, but the future of Ukrainian independence and the principle that no state should be permitted to redraw another country's borders or dictate its political choices through force.
I want this war to end, not to continue indefinitely. But precisely because I consider peace an essential objective, I believe that it cannot be constructed upon fragile assumptions, promises lacking verification mechanisms, or the conviction that a territorial concession alone would be sufficient to alter a major power's strategic objectives.
The real question, therefore, is not merely how much territory Putin would be prepared to accept in exchange for ending hostilities, but what kind of Ukraine and what kind of Europe he would be prepared to recognise after the war.
Until that question receives a credible answer, supported by verifiable commitments, it will be difficult to regard the surrender of Donbas as a sufficient guarantee of peace. A war may end on paper even before the political and strategic conditions that could cause it to resume have disappeared.
And a peace that fails to protect the future risks becoming nothing more than an interval between two tragedies.
