Dublin Returnees and the New EU Migration Pact: What Changes for Italy in 2026

As of 21 August 2026, the issue commonly described through the term "Dublin returnees" has once again moved to the centre of the European political debate. Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden have announced, initiated or resumed transfers of applicants for international protection to Italy, while Rome disputes, at least in part, the interpretation adopted by countries of secondary destination. Madrid, by contrast, has expressed a preference for using the solidarity mechanisms provided for under European law rather than relying on isolated bilateral transfers and restrictions. The issue is often portrayed as a simple dispute over which country must "take migrants back". Legally, however, the matter is considerably more complex: it concerns the very architecture of the Common European Asylum System, namely which State is responsible for examining an application for international protection, within what time limits a transfer may take place, and how responsibility, solidarity and the protection of fundamental rights must be reconciled.

A preliminary clarification of terminology is necessary. The Italian expression dublinante is not an autonomous legal status established by EU law. It is a journalistic and administrative term generally used to describe an applicant for international protection who is present in a European State other than the State identified as responsible for examining the application and who may therefore be subject to an inter-State transfer procedure. A "Dublin returnee" is not necessarily, therefore, simply "a migrant who first entered through Italy". Responsibility is determined through a hierarchy of criteria involving, among other factors, the situation of minors, family links, residence documents or visas, previous applications and the circumstances of entry into the European territory. Describing Dublin transfers generically as "deportations" is equally inaccurate: ordinarily, they are inter-State transfers within the European asylum system, not returns to a country of origin under EU return legislation.

The history of the system predates the present dispute by several decades. The 1990 Dublin Convention established the principle that an asylum application should be examined by a single State. That approach was subsequently incorporated into the Dublin II Regulation, Regulation (EC) No 343/2003, and later into the Dublin III Regulation, Regulation (EU) No 604/2013. The objective was to prevent both multiple applications being lodged in different States and the phenomenon of so-called refugees in orbit, in which individuals could be moved from one State to another without any State ultimately assuming responsibility for examining their claim. The principle was rational in theory, but its practical implementation created a profound geographical imbalance: Member States situated at the Union's external borders — including Italy, Greece, Malta and Spain — inevitably faced greater pressure from arrivals than countries in central and northern Europe.

Even Dublin III, however, did not establish an absolute rule according to which the "country of first entry" was always responsible. The criteria had to be applied according to a specific hierarchy. Family unity and the protection of minors could prevail over irregular entry, while a visa or residence permit issued by another State could also be decisive. Article 13 of Regulation No 604/2013 nevertheless attached considerable importance to irregular entry across an external border, which is one reason Italy remained at the centre of the system for many years. Eurodac, the European database used to compare biometric information and identify previous registrations and asylum applications, further strengthened the practical operation of that mechanism.

It is within this framework that so-called secondary movements arise. A person may enter, be identified or apply for asylum in one State and subsequently travel to another European country, sometimes because stronger family, linguistic, employment or community ties exist there. If the second State considers another country responsible, it can activate the European responsibility procedure. A technical distinction must be drawn between a take charge procedure, in which one State asks another to assume responsibility on the basis of the applicable criteria, and a take back procedure, typically concerning a person who is already connected to the responsible State but has subsequently moved to another country. Much of the contemporary political debate surrounding Dublin returnees concerns precisely this second category.

The structural weaknesses of the Dublin system became particularly evident after 2015. Its fundamental problem did not lie solely in its legal rules, but in the asymmetry between responsibility and solidarity. Border States were subjected to significant obligations without a sufficiently predictable and permanent mechanism for redistributing responsibility. Yet Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union expressly provides that EU policies on border checks, asylum and immigration are to be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States, including its financial implications. The new Pact is, fundamentally, an attempt — albeit a complex and controversial one — to make that principle operational.

A crucial development in relations between Italy and its European partners occurred in December 2022. On 5 December, the Italian Dublin Unit informed other States that incoming Dublin transfers to Italy would be temporarily suspended, subject to limited exceptions, citing the lack of available reception capacity. What was presented as a temporary measure continued for considerably longer. Data from the Italian Dublin Unit reported by AIDA illustrate the imbalance: in 2025 Italy received 19,889 incoming take-charge and take-back requests, while only 132 transfers were actually carried out to Italy; no transfer took place under the take-back procedure. During the same year, Italy sent 8,502 requests to other States and completed only 22 outgoing transfers.

The legality and, above all, the legal consequences of Italy's suspension inevitably reached the Court of Justice of the European Union. In its judgment of 19 December 2024 in Joined Cases C-185/24 and C-189/24, Tudmur, the Court clarified an important point: the mere fact that a Member State unilaterally suspends transfers does not automatically justify a presumption that systemic deficiencies exist in that State's asylum system to such an extent that every transfer must be prevented under Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Protection against inhuman or degrading treatment remains absolute, but its application requires a legally rigorous assessment of the relevant circumstances and, where appropriate, the individual situation of the person concerned.

The position became even clearer on 5 March 2026 with the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-458/24, Daraa. Called upon to assess the consequences of Italy's refusal to accept Dublin transfers, the Court held that a Member State cannot unilaterally free itself from responsibilities arising under the Regulation simply by announcing that it will no longer receive applicants for whom it is responsible. At the same time, Dublin III imposed strict time limits: where a transfer was not carried out within the prescribed period — normally six months, subject to permitted extensions — responsibility could pass automatically to the requesting State. Italy's refusal therefore did not erase the European rules, but the expiry of the applicable deadlines could alter, on a case-by-case basis, which State was responsible. The Court also recalled that systematic failure to comply with EU obligations may ultimately be addressed through infringement proceedings.

Meanwhile, the European Union had already adopted the most extensive reform of the Common European Asylum System in decades. The Pact on Migration and Asylum is not a single piece of legislation, but a package of ten legislative acts adopted in 2024. Among its central components are Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 on asylum and migration management, the recast Eurodac Regulation (EU) 2024/1358, Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 establishing a common procedure for international protection, the Screening Regulation (EU) 2024/1356, Directive (EU) 2024/1346 on reception conditions and Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 addressing situations of crisis and force majeure. A distinction must be made between entry into force and application: although the legislation was adopted and entered into force in 2024, after a two-year transitional period the new system became applicable on 12 June 2026.

For Dublin-related cases, the centrepiece of the reform is Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation — AMMR, which replaced Dublin III from 12 June 2026. It would nevertheless be misleading to say simply that "Dublin has been abolished". Regulation No 604/2013 has indeed been repealed, but the fundamental logic of determining a single responsible State survives and has been incorporated into the AMMR, with significant modifications and, in some respects, stricter rules. Article 1 expressly provides both criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible and a solidarity mechanism. Responsibility and solidarity are therefore not alternatives: they are two pillars of the same system, grounded in Articles 78, 79 and, above all, 80 TFEU.

Article 16 AMMR preserves the principle that an application must be examined by one Member State only. Article 17 generally requires an application to be made and registered in the Member State of first entry, subject to the exceptions established by the Regulation, including situations involving visas or residence permits. Applicants are also required to cooperate with the authorities, provide the biometric data required under the new Eurodac framework and remain in the State where they are required to be during the determination of responsibility and any subsequent transfer procedure. The Pact therefore expressly seeks to limit secondary movements. This does not mean, however, that first entry automatically overrides every other consideration: Article 24 maintains a hierarchy of responsibility criteria, while the following provisions attach particular importance to unaccompanied minors, family unity, residence documents, visas and other qualifying links.

The rule governing irregular entry has also been redesigned. Article 33 of Regulation 2024/1351 provides that where it is established that an applicant irregularly crossed the border of a Member State after entering from a third country, that Member State is generally responsible. That responsibility nevertheless ceases where the application is registered more than 20 months after the irregular border crossing. The same Article contains specific provisions concerning disembarkation following search-and-rescue operations. This illustrates why the issue cannot properly be reduced to a slogan: responsibility is determined through the application of European legal criteria to the individual case, rather than through a political presumption that anyone who has passed through Italy necessarily "belongs" to Italy.

The new regime also seeks to accelerate procedures. Take-charge requests and take-back notifications are subject to strict deadlines, while the new take-back framework relies extensively on inter-State notifications supported by Eurodac information. Once the responsible State has been identified, Article 46 AMMR provides that the transfer must take place as soon as practically possible and normally within six months. If the deadline expires without the transfer being executed, responsibility passes to the State that was required to carry it out. The Regulation permits longer extensions in specific circumstances: up to one year in cases of imprisonment and, under certain circumstances involving absconding, physical resistance to transfer or intentional conduct designed to prevent it, up to three years. This represents one of the clearest examples of the new system's stricter approach to secondary movements.

None of these mechanisms, however, can override fundamental rights. Article 16(3) of the new Regulation prevents a transfer where there are substantial grounds for believing that it would expose the person concerned to a real risk of a fundamental-rights violation amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter. This protection operates alongside Article 18 of the Charter on the right to asylum, Article 24 concerning children and their best interests, Article 47 on the right to an effective remedy and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. For children, survivors of torture, trafficking or sexual violence, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable applicants, an individual assessment is therefore not a procedural detail but an essential element of the lawfulness of any transfer. The AMMR also expressly regulates the transmission of health information and information concerning specific needs before a transfer takes place.

The transitional provisions are particularly important in the current dispute between Rome and Berlin. Article 84 AMMR must be interpreted carefully. Where an application for international protection was registered before 12 June 2026, the determination of the responsible State remains governed by Dublin III. Where an application was registered after 12 June 2026, facts occurring before that date may nevertheless be taken into account when responsibility is determined under the new Regulation. The text therefore does not establish a general amnesty or an automatic cancellation of all pre-12 June cases. Older cases must be assessed under Dublin III, including any deadlines that may already have expired, whereas the new Regulation governs the relevant post-12 June cases.

This is precisely where the political interpretations of Italy and Germany diverge. According to Berlin, Germany and Italy reached arrangements in autumn 2025 within the framework of migration cooperation, on the basis of which the German authorities considered that transfers to Italy should resume when the new Common European Asylum System became applicable in June 2026. Italian authorities, by contrast, publicly advanced an interpretation according to which earlier cases had effectively been "reset", a position Germany does not share. From a strictly legal perspective, bilateral administrative arrangements cannot be attributed effects that EU law does not confer upon them. Regulation 2024/1351 itself permits administrative arrangements between States to simplify procedures and cooperation, but requires them to remain compatible with the Regulation.

The practical consequence is significant. An older case may indeed no longer be transferable to Italy if, under Dublin III, the relevant deadlines have expired and responsibility has consequently passed to the requesting State. But that conclusion must result from an examination of the individual procedure, not from a general theory that 12 June 2026 indiscriminately erased every previous case. Equally, in post-12 June proceedings it is not enough merely to demonstrate that a person physically passed through Italy: authorities must apply the entire hierarchy of AMMR criteria, examine family links and other grounds of responsibility, comply with procedural deadlines and safeguards, and rule out any obstacle deriving from fundamental rights.

The dispute became particularly visible in August 2026. Berlin stated that the effective operation of the mechanism for determining the responsible Member State is indispensable to the success of the new Common European Asylum System and announced the resumption of transfers to Italy and Greece. Germany subsequently reiterated that, according to its interpretation of the 2025 arrangements, procedures were expected to restart with the application of the Pact.

The issue now extends well beyond Germany and Italy. Austria has reported carrying out four transfers to Italy; Switzerland — although not an EU Member State, it participates in the Dublin system through association agreements — has planned a gradual resumption of transfers from the end of August; Finland has indicated that procedures are being prepared; and Sweden has stated that transfers to Italy have already taken place and are expected to continue. Politically, the most significant element is that several European States are treating 12 June 2026 as the point at which a responsibility system that had remained largely paralysed in relation to Italy should become operational again.

Spain's position demonstrates, however, that Europe is not following a single political approach. Madrid has expressed a preference for using the solidarity mechanisms established by the new Pact rather than relying on isolated bilateral removals or restrictions. Politically, that distinction matters. Legally, however, solidarity and responsibility cannot be treated as mutually exclusive. The new framework requires both. A Member State experiencing migratory pressure may benefit from European solidarity while remaining required to comply with the rules determining whether it is responsible for individual applicants.

This is perhaps the most significant structural innovation of the Pact. Articles 56 et seq. of Regulation 2024/1351 establish an Annual Solidarity Pool for Member States experiencing migratory pressure. At Union level, the Commission's annual proposal must provide for at least 30,000 relocations and €600 million in financial contributions. Member States may contribute through relocations, financial contributions or other measures permitted by the Regulation, according to a fair-share formula based on European parameters. Solidarity therefore becomes structural and mandatory within the overall system, while States retain considerable discretion regarding the specific form of their contribution. This does not mean that every person arriving in Italy must automatically be relocated elsewhere, nor does it permit Italy to suspend responsibility procedures until solidarity is provided.

The argument concerning NGO rescue vessels flying the flags of other European States must likewise be approached with legal caution. The fact that a rescue vessel flies the German, French or another European flag does not, in itself, create under Regulation 2024/1351 a general Italian right to "offset" Dublin transfers by refusing an equivalent number of applicants. The AMMR establishes specific procedures governing responsibility connected with disembarkation following search-and-rescue operations, as well as solidarity, relocation and responsibility-offset mechanisms. The Regulation does not establish a unilateral power to conduct a numerical set-off based simply on a vessel's flag. Any solution must therefore operate within the procedures established by EU law and in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU.

Otherwise, Europe risks reproducing the central weakness of the old system: each State invoking only the part of European law that best serves its immediate national interest. States of first entry demand solidarity and a reduction in their burden; States affected by secondary movements insist on take-charge and take-back obligations; some governments tighten internal border controls, while others demand greater redistribution. A common system cannot function if responsibility, solidarity and free movement are applied selectively depending on the political interests of the moment.

The Dublin returnee controversy is therefore much more than an administrative dispute between Rome and Berlin. It represents the first genuine stress test of the Pact on Migration and Asylum after 12 June 2026. Formally, Dublin III is gone. Substantively, however, the problem that Dublin attempted to resolve remains: ensuring that an application for international protection does not become everyone's responsibility and, for that very reason, ultimately no one's responsibility. Regulation 2024/1351 attempts to correct the old imbalance by combining responsibility with a permanent solidarity mechanism, strengthening Eurodac, tightening rules concerning secondary movements and creating common instruments for Member States under migratory pressure.

The success of the new Pact will nevertheless depend upon something that legislation alone cannot create: mutual trust and reliability among European States. Italy has a legitimate point when it argues that a border State cannot be left alone to bear a responsibility deriving largely from geography rather than political choice. Other States have an equally serious legal argument when they maintain that a common system cannot function if the State identified as responsible systematically refuses to implement European transfer procedures. Article 80 TFEU is precisely the provision that should reconcile these positions: there can be no responsibility without solidarity, but neither can there be solidarity without responsibility.

Above all, behind every Dublin file there remains a human being. From an administrative perspective, a transfer may appear to be little more than the movement of legal responsibility from one European jurisdiction to another. For the person concerned, it may mean separation from family, disruption of an integration process, transfer into a different reception system or the re-emergence of profound vulnerabilities. European law does not prohibit transfers; on the contrary, it expressly regulates them. But it requires decisions to be individualised, reasoned, open to effective judicial challenge and compatible with human dignity. The credibility of the new European asylum system will ultimately depend on maintaining that balance between effective rules, solidarity among States and the concrete protection of individuals. If the Pact becomes merely another instrument through which governments pass people from one jurisdiction to another, Europe will have changed its regulations without solving the underlying problem. If responsibility and solidarity are genuinely applied together, 12 June 2026 may instead mark a real transition from the old Dublin logic towards a genuinely common European asylum system.